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REVIEW ESSAY
Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill
and London, The University of North Carolina Press, 1994. 274
pp. $34.95).
reviewed by Daniel J. Giffordt
In The State and Labor in Modern America, Professor Melvyn
Dubofsky has given us a comprehensive account of the development of
American labor law from its period of gestation at the end of the
nineteenth century to the present. Professor Dubofsky's concern is with
the impact of law and regulatory agencies on labor unions, their power
and their abilities to organize the work force. In adopting this focus,
the author is fully aware of the impact of politics, not only on the
incentives of Congress to enact legislation, but on the way in which
existing legal institutions are administered. As a result, Dubofsky has
given us a rich tapestry depicting the birth, struggles, dominance and
ultimate decline of the labor-union movement over the course of a
century in the context of shifting political allegiances and changing laws
and legal institutions.
Because Dubofsky's subject is labor history, he quite properly does
not address the economics of the labor movement, the wisdom of labor
strategy or the differences between organized labor in the United States
and its counterparts abroad. He does, however, reflect on the causes of
the growth and latter-day decline of the labor movement in this country.
Dubofsky accurately identifies government support--or the lack
thereof-as critical to the success of the union movement. His decision
to avoid commenting on the social and economic impact of organized
labor's characteristic bargaining and political strategies is disappointing
but not surprising. These strategies have affected not only the larger
society, but have had unintended consequences for labor, as well. Yet
they belong more to economic and political analysis than to history.
Accordingly, while these matters are not integral to the historical
t Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
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narrative Dubofsky gives us, their inclusion would have made the book
an even more valuable research tool.
Dubofsky leads us through the decades in which presidential power
was employed to break strikes, often with soldiers, and in which the
courts used the Sherman Act to issue sweeping injunctions against
strikers. He reminds us of the pervasive judicial hostility toward labor
unions throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
That hostility destroyed the effectiveness of the congressional attempt
in the Clayton Act to prevent the use of the antitrust laws against
striking workers. As a result, the antitrust laws continued to provide the
rationale for anti-strike injunctions into the 1920s. Indeed, the most
sweeping and best known of the Sherman Act labor injunctions was
issued by Judge James Wilkerson in 1922 against striking railroad
workers.
As the title of his book indicates, Dubofsky's focus is on the power
of the state to encourage or discourage unionization and on the power
of politics to shape the direction of governmental policy. Government
is, of course, only one major influence on unionization; another is the
demand for labor. Dubofsky shows us the interplay between these two
determinants. Union-organizing drives were successful during the
World War I years, when the effects of full employment and labor
scarcity were reinforced by political support from the Woodrow Wilson
Administration. But this success was subsequently transformed into a
decline when, in the post-war period, the labor market slackened and
unions lost their political support. Yet in the Franklin Roosevelt period,
despite the severe economic downturn, the Committee for Industrial
Organization (CIO) successfully conducted the largest organizing drive
in history, with the effective backing of the nascent National Labor
Relations Board. Government is, in Dubofsky's view, a critical
ingredient in the growth or decline of the union movement.
Dubofsky identifies leading officials from the Wilson Administra-
tion who either reentered government with Franklin Roosevelt in the
1930s or otherwise influenced his administration: Bernard Baruch,
Louis Wehle, Felix Frankfurter and Hugh Johnson. The author shows
us the conjunction of ideological commitment in many former Wilson
Administration officials' with the political need of the New Deal to
1. Felix Frankfurter had served as secretary of President Wilson's Mediation Commission and
as chair of the War Labor Policies Board. In both positions, Frankfurter sought ways to induce or to
require employers to bargain with labor unions. Many former officials who had been influenced by him
reentered government. So did numerous other ex-Wilson officials who had been influenced by Frank
P. Walsh or John R. Commons of Wilson's Commission on Industrial Relations.
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court labor as an essential element in its electoral base. He takes us
through the legislative struggles culminating in the Wagner Act and
leads us through the post-enactment period, marked by sit-down strikes
and a massive organizing campaign of the CIO, the success of which
restructured labor relations in American mass-production industry.
On the level of politics, Dubofsky demonstrates how Theodore
Roosevelt, not particularly a union enthusiast, created political capital
by supporting labor. The author shows us the conversion of Woodrow
Wilson from an attitude of basic hostility to one sympathetic to unions,
a conversion that coincided with his political advantage. Dubofsky
takes us through the Wilson years that generated the official reports2
and institutional frameworks that underlay most of the early labor
policies of Franklin Roosevelt. The author shows us how Roosevelt's
political base became dependent on labor union support and how,
despite the necessary alliance between the president and organized labor,
alterations in administration policy nevertheless reflected the shifting
composition of Congress as well as overriding governmental impera-
tives. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted in 1935
when support for the New Deal ran high, but administration support for
labor cooled after sit-down strikes in the automobile industry and
Republican gains in the 1938 elections. Again, during the period
leading up to American entry into World War II, the Roosevelt
Administration felt compelled to rely on the expertise of industry
executives to plan the war effort and intentionally relegated labor to
secondary and advisory roles.
Yet some of the historical continuities remain unemphasized and,
in this reviewer's view, underanalyzed. In the disastrous Pullman strike,
President Grover Cleveland sent soldiers to enforce an injunction he
thought necessary to protect essential arteries of transportation. A
quarter century later, Judge Wilkerson gave President Warren G.
Harding the sweeping injunction he requested against striking railroad
shopmen for essentially the same reasons. President Ronald Reagan's
notorious discharge of members of the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization (PATCO) occurred when the operations of
major transport arteries were threatened.3 Although Congress attempted
to outlaw the labor injunction in the Clayton Act and was compelled by
2. Final Report of the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1916) (Walsh Report) (recommending recognition of rights to organize and to collective
bargaining).
3. The PATCO strike and its aftermath are described, inter alia, in Schapansky v. United States,
735 F.2d 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
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judicial intransigence and evasion to enact further prohibitions on labor
injunctions in the Norris-LaGuardia Act,4 Congress also has repeatedly
approved limitations on organized labor's power to threaten major
interruptions to the economy. President Cleveland's actions against the
Pullman strikers were endorsed in a Joint Resolution of Congress.' In
the Transportation Act of 1920, Congress established the Railroad Labor
Board with the apparent power to impose settlements on railroads and
unions.6 In the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Congress limited the right to
strike in national emergencies. In these cases, strikes were prohibited
for a "cooling off' period of sixty days, while the parties-with
government encouragement-sought to reach an acceptable compro-
mise.7 And the air traffic controllers were forbidden to strike by law.
These presidential and congressional actions suggest an underlying
social problem: the national interest in commerce and trade is, or
sometimes is perceived as, jeopardized by strikes at important transpor-
tation arteries. Dubofsky's labor sympathies may have obscured the
similarities in these events. All of them have involved government
interference with strikes at important avenues of national transportation.
Dubofsky does not ignore the particular government actions-the
legislation or the injunctions or the governmental actions taken under
them. Nor does he ignore all similarities. Indeed, he compares the
language employed by Reagan against the air traffic controllers in 1981
to that used by Cleveland and Harding against railroad workers decades
earlier. But Dubofsky does not examine the social and economic
underpinnings of these events, nor does he provide us with criteria for
sorting out the conflicting claims of workers, their employers and the
public in these cases. Surely threats to major transportation arteries rise
to the level of federal concern. Dubofsky is silent on the critical issue
of whether society should respond to an actual or threatened disruption
of major transportation arteries with passive tolerance, or whether it
should exercise more imaginative options that would protect the national
interest, yet afford room for labor and management to work out their
differences.
At various places, Dubofsky refers to concepts like industrial
pluralism, the politics of productivity, economic democracy and
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1995).
5. 26 Cong. Rec. 7281-7284, 7544-7547 (1894).
6. Title Il of the Transportation Act, 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 469-74 (repealed 1926). The
year following the strike of the shopmen in 1922, the Supreme Court ruled that the Railroad Labor
Board lacked the power to impose its decisions. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Railroad Labor Board, 261 U.S.
72 (1923).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1995).
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corporatism. All of these concepts are pregnant with meaning, which
he often fails to develop in this book, believing, perhaps, that his
readers attribute the same meanings to them as he does.
Although Dubofsky appears to approve of "corporatism," he uses
that term in the broad sense of interest-group bargaining and compro-
mise under the general tutelage of the government. Indeed, he equates
corporatism with "industrial pluralism," a phrase suggestive of an
industrial analogue to the pluralist model of government that prevailed
in the post-World War II era. Here he is adopting the usage of Charles
Maier, who has employed the term "corporatism" to describe the process
by which industry, labor and perhaps other interest groups separate
themselves from parliamentary or other democratic government,
working out their own accommodations with one another directly.
Maier used the term in this sense to describe the changes in European
political structures that occurred in the decade after World War 1.8 In
Maier's usage, corporatism embraced Italian fascism, which formally
allocated significant self-governing powers to industrial groups, 9 but
also included the formal and informal structures in Weimar Germany
and France in which industry and labor worked out their relations inter
se. Maier's usage also describes the informal and nongovernmental
interaction between organized labor and industry in the United States
during the three decades following World War II, through which these
institutions cooperatively governed the workplace. It is this usage,
embodying interest-group bargaining and compromise, that Dubofsky
intends to employ.
An array of corporatist structures have been in place on the
European continent at least since the end of World War I. At that time,
workers councils at the plant level were legislatively instituted in
Germany, and such councils continue to this day.' Although these
councils originally were purely advisory, they generally raised the level
of participation felt by individual workers. Today, these councils
provide for worker representation at both the plant and enterprise levels
and provide a means for workers to participate, to a significant degree,
8. CHARLES S. MAIER, RECASTING BOURGEOIS EUROPE (1975).
9. Maier's usage fits the classical conception of extra-parliamentary collaboration among the
classes. See generally ZEEV STERNHELL ET AL., THE BIRTH OF FASCIST IDEOLOGY (David Maisel
trans., 1994). Indeed, it also fits the position of early Italian fascism, under which the state was to limit
its operations to the juridical and leave industry free to govern itself. See id. at 227-228.
10. See MAIER, supra note 8, at 160-64. See also Clyde W. Summers, Worker Participation in
the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP.
L. 367, 375, 384 (1980) (discussing, inter alia, the Works Council Act of 1920 and the Codetermination
Law of 1976).
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in managerial decisions. Tripartite structures involving unions,
companies and government in policy decisions about output and
operations also can fit a corporatist mode, as when they are designed to
facilitate interest-group accommodation. Such structures were estab-
lished in this country by the abortive National Industrial Recovery Act.
Dubofsky's comprehensive history of U.S. government labor policy
describes the creation and operation of numerous tripartite panels com-
posed of representatives of capital, labor and the public, many of which
earned the hostility of organized labor, as public members teamed with
employer members to form permanent anti-labor majorities. Dubofsky's
endorsement of corporatism, however, is not intended to endorse these
formal tripartite structures. Indeed, tripartite panels of this type serve
to impose conditions upon organized labor rather than act to facilitate
negotiation and compromise between labor and industry.
Dubofsky's endorsement of industrial pluralism rests on the
optimistic assumption that the government will assume a positive role
in holding wage-rate increases to productivity growth, thereby protecting
the public from inflation. In adopting this assumption, he places
industrial pluralism within the broad parameters of what he refers to as
a "politics of productivity." Although the author himself does not
develop the latter concept in his book, he again relies on Charles Maier
for his terminology. Maier, whom Dubofsky cites, used the term to
describe a social arrangement in which class conflicts over redistribution
are transformed into a shared focus on improving economic perfor-
mance.' 2 So long as a constantly increasing national income permits
workers to share in a growing prosperity, redistributional issues become
muted. In context, it appears that Dubofsky may be using the phrase as
suggestive of a political relationship in which government support of
organized labor is contingent on wage demands being held to produc-
tivity increases. Currently, European governments often exercise a
restraining power over industry/union negotiations in order to keep
wages and prices within socially acceptable, i.e., noninflationary, limits.
During the period Dubofsky describes as the zenith of industrial
pluralism, the John F. Kennedy Administration attempted to influence
wage bargaining through wage-price guidelines and the "jawboning" of
labor and management. Departures from such standards produced the
economic disasters of the 1970s, from which the nation is still
recovering. Although the American government no longer monitors
11. See Summers, supra note 10, at 380.
12. Charles S. Maier, The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International
Economic Policy after World War 11, 31 INT'L ORG. 607 (1977).
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wage agreements, it influences the general level of wage rates through
the actions of the Federal Reserve.
Although Dubofsky sees "industrial pluralism" as a species of the
"pluralist" politics of the post-war period, 3 he does not adequately
face the deficiencies of this model. The pluralist model leaves out
unorganized and diffuse interests. Similarly, the industrial pluralist
model leaves out all of the unorganized workers, who go unrepresented
and largely ignored in workplace governance. Indeed, the American
model of labor organization--despite the rise of industrial unions-has
operated on the craft-union paradigm in that it advances the interests of
its own members at the expense of the class of nonmembers, a class that
includes the most disadvantaged members of society. Indeed, Dubofsky
recognizes that the industrial pluralist model he finds attractive was in
fact undermined by the success of the civil rights movement. The
resulting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' 4 imposed on
unions and employers affirmative obligations to ensure that racial and
ethnic minorities, women and immigrants were hired and promoted, thus
undercutting organized labor's control of the manufacturing work force.
Yet, although Dubofsky sees the conflict between organized labor and
the civil rights movement, he tends to see that conflict as accidental or
incidental, rather than as a necessary result of the focus of organized
labor on the economic enhancement of part, rather than all, of the work
force.
Dubofsky ignores the experience of cost-push inflation that was
responsible for much of the U.S. economy's troubles in the 1970s.
Economists have pointed out how organized labor's wage demands have
interacted with federal monetary policy to impose ever higher money
wages, with resulting inflationary effects. 5 Monetary policy combined
with organized labor's excessive wage demands when the Federal
Reserve reacted to unemployment created by high-money wage rates by
increasing the money supply. This stimulation reduced unemployment
temporarily, but at the expense of engendering another, higher round of
the wage-price cycle. Indeed, Karen Orren, whom Dubofsky cites, poses
a devastating critique of organized labor's political agenda. She
suggests not only that organized labor has pursued a wage strategy in
bargaining with employers that has incidentally resulted in cost-push
13. See generally THEODORE J. Low], THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
14. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1995)).
15. See, e.g., ROBERT J. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS 192 (1978).
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inflation, but that organized labor's consistent political strategy has been
directed toward expansionary monetary policies.' 6
Finally, because organized labor's focus has remained narrow, its
wage objectives have undermined the long-term interests of unionized
employers in international competition and have created substantial
structural unemployment. Contrary to the policies of Swedish unions,
which have sought to narrow wage differentials among industries,
7
U.S. industrial unions have successfully raised the wage rate in the most
productive industries, transforming those industries from ones with
comparative advantages in international trade into industries with the
highest differential wage costs, a transformation that erodes or destroys
their competitive advantages. The U.S. automobile industry, for
example, bears differentially high wage costs vis-A-vis other U.S.
manufacturing industries as compared to their Japanese competitors,
who pay closer to the prevailing Japanese manufacturing wage rate.'8
Economy-wide differences among nations are sorted out in the currency
markets. But differential costs among industries, including wage rates,
are critical factors in international competition. These factors have been
largely ignored by U.S. labor when it formulates its bargaining and
lobbying strategies. Rather than look to the imaginative policies
pursued in nations like Japan and Sweden for bettering labor's return,
organized labor in the United States has focused on short-term
aggrandizement and-as exemplified by its opposition to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-has lobbied for trade
protection.
The negative impact the policies pursued by organized labor have
had on the unorganized sectors of the work force and on society in
general is largely due to labor's narrow vision-its focus on the short-
term betterment of its members without regard to the consequences of
its policies on nonmembers or the public generally. Such a narrow
vision might have been appropriate in early years, but organized labor's
success in mass-production industries called for a wider vision if it was
to remain a major force in the economy. Had organized labor made an
attempt to develop a vision of its place in a dynamic industrial society
in which it possessed significant power, it would have inquired into how
its behavior could affect the long-term position of its own members as
16. Karen Ofren, Union Politics and Postwar Liberalism in the United States, 1946-1979, in I
STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 215, 243 (Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek eds.,
1986).
17. See Robert J. Flanagan, Efficiency and Equality in Swedish Labor Markets, in THE SWEDISH
ECONOMY 125, 131-133 (Barry P. Bosworth & Alice M. Rivlin eds., 1987).
18. See JUNICHI GOTO. LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY 61, 130 (1990).
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well as the unorganized segment of the work force and the public
generally. Attention to the long term would have brought issues of
productivity and the welfare of the working class generally to the fore.
Union concern with productivity would have encouraged unions to
discard many imbedded "work rules" and to cooperate with employers
in ways only recently manifested in places like General Motors' Saturn
plant or New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI), the General
Motors-Toyota joint venture in Freemont, California.' 9 A concern
with the welfare of the entire working class would have moved
organized labor in the direction of advocating a "manpower" policy
whose objective-in Orren's words-is "matching labor demand and
supply through such programs as job training. 2 °
The focus of a manpower policy is on raising the return of all
workers by enhancing their productivity through skills training or other
means. Such a policy reduces conflict and spreads benefits throughout
the working class. Indeed, a manpower policy unites concerns about
enhancing productivity with concerns about enhancing the earnings of
the working class. The entire society enjoys the rewards of a successful
manpower policy. Had organized labor publicized its own belief in
manpower goals and shaped its own policies in light of those goals
during the last several decades, it would have earned widespread
respect, instead of a growing society-wide disenchantment with its
single-minded efforts to benefit its own members over the short term,
regardless of the consequences to other groups and to society at large.
A manpower focus is peculiarly appropriate for organized labor,
since its direct object is the economic enhancement of the working class,
the class to which organized labor appeals. Labor unions should be
directing their lobbying efforts in support of the adoption, by the federal
government, of effective national manpower policies, and they should
take into account how their own operational goals affect the working
class generally. A manpower focus by the federal government and a
manpower focus by unions in the formulation of their day-to-day
operational policies would unite organized labor and government as
cooperative participants with capital in bringing the unskilled and the
underskilled into the economic mainstream. This kind of focus would
reduce the sense of alienation felt by these less favored groups and
would enlist them in a society-wide effort to increase productivity.
Indeed, enhancing the productivity of the entire working class reduces
19. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 123-31 (1993).
20. Orren, supra note 16, at 243.
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social conflict and expands national income. It is, in a sense, a modem
version of the politics of productivity. This kind of focus is urgently
needed as technological change advances and U.S. industry becomes
increasingly subject to global competition.
A number of European nations-such as Sweden, Austria and, to
a lesser extent, Germany-as well as Japan have adopted manpower
policies designed to enhance the skills of the work force and thus to
enhance the economic return to labor overall. In Sweden, that policy
has been promoted by organized labor, which has accepted the
responsibility for promoting the welfare of workers generally, a
responsibility perhaps more easily embraced by Swedish than American
unions because of Sweden's high rate of union membership.2
Dubofsky's otherwise impressive book fails to recognize that the
decline of the labor movement is critically related to the narrow policies
that have been pursued by that movement's leaders, at a time when
rapid technological and social change has mandated a broad vision.
Labor's leaders have followed a craft-union paradigm when they needed
to concentrate, at a minimum, on the long-term interests of the entire
working class.
21. See generally Flanagan, supra note 17.
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